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Liberal Ideals and Political Feasibility:
Guest-Worker Programs as Second-Best Policies
Howard F Chang*
A liberalized guest-worker program appeared to be a priority
on the political agenda while President George W. Bush weighed
proposals to expand access to employment-based visas' until
terrorist attacks placed these plans on hold.2 Support from both
labor unions and business interests may make liberalizing reforms
politically feasible in the near future,3 as the Bush administration,
with the support of Democrats in Congress, has recently resumed
negotiations with Mexico on immigration policy.4  This dramatic
reversal of the overwhelmingly restrictionist politics of recent
years is a welcome development, as considerations of not only
national economic welfare but also social justice militate in favor
of liberalizing reforms.
In the case of skilled aliens, the United States can lift
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Visiting Professor of
Law, University of Michigan Law School. Ph.D., 1992, MIT; J.D., 1987, Harvard;
M.P.A., 1985, Princeton; A.B., 1982, Harvard. I would like to thank the Symposium
participants at the University of North Carolina School of Law for their helpful
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1 See Dan Eggen & Helen Dewar, Bush Weighing Plan for Mexican Guest
Workers, WASH. POST, July 25, 2001, at A3; Eric Schmitt, Bush Panel Backs Legalizing
Status of Some Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2001, at Al; Eric Schmitt, Bush Says Plan
for Immigrants Could Expand, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2001, at Al; Eric Schmitt, U.S.-
Mexico Talks Produce Agreement on Immigration Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2001, at
A4.
2 See Alfredo Corchado, Immigration Talks Between U.S., Mexico on Hold,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 19, 2001, at 5A; Mike Doming, Mexico Border Issue on
Hold, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 21, 2001, at 16; Greg Miller & Nick Anderson, Mood Swiftly
Changes on Immigration, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at A12; James Sterngold, Legal
Residency Hopes of Millions Dashed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001, at A33.
3 See Thomas B. Edsall & Cheryl W. Thompson, Alliance Forms on Immigrant
Policies: Business, Church, Labor Groups Unite on Liberalization, WASH. POST, Aug. 7,
2001, at Al.
4 See Mary Jordan & Kevin Sullivan, U.S. and Mexico to Resume Talks on
Immigration Policy, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2001, at A40; Ginger Thompson, Top
Democrats Politick Through Rural Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2001, at A12.
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restrictions on the employment of aliens consistent with the
national interest by liberalizing access to employment-based
immigrant visas for skilled workers.5 Skilled workers tend to have
higher incomes and pay more in taxes than they cost in terms of
public benefits. The empirical evidence confirms that educated
immigrants will on average have a net positive effect on natives,
taking into account their effects on the public treasury.6
In the case of unskilled aliens, however, the optimal policy-
from the perspective of the interests of natives-departs
significantly from the policy prescribed by liberal ideals. From
the narrow perspective of the economic interests of natives,
temporary worker visas may be an optimal response to fiscal
concerns regarding alien access to public benefits.7 Through
guest-worker programs, natives enjoy the benefits of unskilled
alien workers in the labor market but do not bear the fiscal burden
of providing the full set of public benefits that these workers
would receive if they had ready access to permanent residence and
ultimately citizenship.8 Although immigrants can gain full access
to public benefits upon naturalization, only aliens "admitted for
permanent residence" may naturalize as U.S. citizens.9 Aliens
admitted on nonimmigrant visas only, including temporary
workers, are not admitted as permanent residents and thus are not
eligible for most public entitlements and are not eligible to
naturalize. Current U.S. laws generally exclude not only
5 See Howard F. Chang, The Economic Analysis of Immigration Law, in
MIGRATION THEORY: TALKING ACROSS DISCIPLINES 205, 221-22 (Caroline B. Brettell &
James F. Hollifield eds., 2000).
6 The National Research Council, for example, found that the average immigrant
with more than a high-school education pays enough in taxes to produce a net fiscal
benefit. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC,
DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 334 (James P. Smith & Barry
Edmonston eds., 1997) [hereinafter NRC]. In fact, once the NRC economists take the
positive fiscal effect of the immigrant's descendants into account, they find that the
average immigrant with a high-school education produces a net surplus of $51,000, and
the average immigrant with more than a high-school education produces a net surplus of
$198,000. Id. at 334 tbl.7.5 (reporting net present value of average fiscal impacts in
1996 dollars).
7 See Chang, supra note 5, at 222.
8 For a discussion of the gains that natives enjoy from immigration in the labor
market, see NRC, supra note 6, at 135-53.
9 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2000).
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unauthorized immigrants but also nonimmigrants, including
temporary workers, from a broad range of public benefits: With
only narrow exceptions, these aliens are ineligible for "any Federal
public benefit.""° Thus, because guest-worker programs can give
unskilled aliens access to our labor markets without necessarily
providing full access to the benefits provided to citizens, these
programs may allow the most liberal admissions policies possible
for these aliens without imposing a fiscal burden on natives.
From the perspective of the interests of aliens, or from the
perspective of liberal principles of social justice, however, these
guest-worker programs are only second-best policies. The ideal
policy, from these perspectives, may be legal permanent residence
and access to citizenship and to all public benefits. This policy
would be costly for natives, however, as the empirical evidence
suggests that unskilled alien workers are likely to have a net
negative fiscal impact if granted ready access to permanent
residence and ultimately citizenship." Thus, the self-interest of
natives is bound to impose constraints of political feasibility on the
availability of immigrant visas. It may be politically infeasible to
ask natives to set aside their collective self-interest in formulating
our immigration laws.' 2 The U.S. government will likely continue
to deem the promotion of the interests of natives the paramount
objective of our immigration policies. 3 Thus, as long as natives
are limited in their willingness to bear these fiscal burdens, they
are likely to restrict alien access to permanent residence, either
through quantitative restrictions or through qualitative restrictions
10 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2000).
11 Taking the positive fiscal effect of the immigrant's descendants into account, the
National Research Council finds that the average immigrant with less than a high-school
education imposes a net fiscal burden of $13,000. NRC, supra note 6, at 334 tbl.7.5
(reporting net present value of average fiscal impacts in 1996 dollars).
12 As Seidman observes, the limitations imposed by "bounded caring" are, "like it
or not ... facts that exist in the world" and "unlikely to change more than marginally in
the near future," so that any "real-world immigration policy must ... take account of
these facts and work around them." Louis Michael Seidman, Fear and Loathing at the
Border, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 136, 140 (Warren F. Schwartz ed., 1995).
13 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 98-62, at 3 (1983) ("[T]he paramount obligation of any
nation's government, indeed the very reason for its existence and the justification for its
power, is to promote the national interest-the long-term welfare of the majority of its
citizens and their descendants.").
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that establish demanding criteria for immigrant visa eligibility. 14
Some observers have described guest-worker programs
without access to permanent residence as "more politically
viable."15 Thus, the Bush administration has shifted its energies
toward a program for temporary workers, which it regards as
"more acceptable politically.' ' 16  Recognizing the political
controversy generated by proposals that would grant access to
citizenship, Mexico has also emphasized an expanded guest-
worker program in its negotiations with the Bush administration
and has been careful not to press the issue of citizenship.
17
Under any politically feasible scenario, there will be many
aliens who would like to gain access to the labor market but who
are excluded by our immigration policies. Political constraints are
likely to exclude many unskilled aliens from the U.S. labor market
unless they are either willing to immigrate illegally or have access
to guest-worker visas. Given these constraints on access to
permanent residence, guest-worker programs may represent the
only alternative to illegal immigration for aliens otherwise
excluded from the U.S. labor market. 8  Under these
14 Cf. Ronald Brownstein, Residency at Core of Immigrant Debate, L.A. TIMES,
July 29, 2001, at Al (discussing the debate over criteria and legislation that would allow
immigrants to achieve permanent resident status).
15 Jonathan Peterson, Amnesty's the Road Bump in Debate on Immigration, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2001, at A12. Conservative Republicans like Senator Phil Gramm
adamantly oppose any access to permanent residence for guest workers. Gramm has said
that any such program would have to pass "over my cold, dead political body." Michelle
Mittelstadt, Senators Callfor Giving Residency to Immigrants, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
July 19, 2001, at IA. In a recent Gallup poll, sixty-seven percent of respondents rejected
easier access to U.S. citizenship for unauthorized immigrants, while only twenty-eight
percent supported this proposal. Steve Sailer, Analysis: Why Bush Blundered on
Immigrants, UPI, Sept. 10, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
16 Jonathan Peterson, Immigration Emphasis on Guest Visas, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18,
2001, atAl.
17 By maintaining flexibility on this issue, Mexico seeks, as the Mexican foreign
minister Jorge Castaneda puts it, "as many rights as possible, for as many Mexicans (in
the United States) as possible, as soon as possible" within the constraints of political
feasibility. Robert Collier, Momentum Grows to Legalize Migrants, S.F CHRON., July
16, 2001, at Al. As one Mexican negotiator explained, "we . . . have to be very
realistic." Alfredo Corchado, Fox Pushes for a More Open Border, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, July 16, 2001, at IA. Castaneda has explained that access to citizenship "is not
something of huge significance to us." Sergio Munoz, Jorge Castaneda: Mexico s Man
Abroad, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2001, at M3.
18 See JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 303
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circumstances, an expanded guest-worker program would
represent an improvement not only for the aliens who thereby gain
admission but also for natives.
In this essay, I argue in favor of a liberalized guest-worker
program as a reform that would promote the welfare of both
natives and aliens, compared to the politically feasible alternatives.
In Part I, I propose a series of reforms that expands access to the
U.S. labor market for unskilled alien workers without imposing an
economic burden on natives. In Part II, I argue that although
guest-worker programs do not comply with liberal ideals, they
nevertheless represent an improvement over the alternative of
exclusion, whether from the standpoint of the guest worker or
from the perspective of cosmopolitan liberalism. In Part III, I
conclude that given political constraints that make more ideal
policies infeasible, liberals concerned with the welfare of aliens
should support liberalized guest-worker programs.
I. Guest-Worker Programs and the Interests of Natives
Current programs for unskilled guest workers are subject to
protectionist restrictions and are therefore little used.'9 For
example, both H-2A visas for agricultural workers and H-2B visas
for other unskilled workers are subject to burdensome "labor
certification" requirements. 20 Furthermore, H-2B visas are limited
to 66,000 per year,2' and require workers to come "temporarily to
the United States to perform . . . temporary service or labor., 2
2
This "double requirement of 'temporariness"' requires the H-2B
alien not only to enter temporarily, but also to fill a temporary
(1989) ("Being a temporary worker may well be inferior, and may even seem 'unfair,'
compared to full admission as a legal immigrant, but this simply is not a realistic
alternative; to compare a temporary worker program unfavorably against a non-existent
alternative is either thoughtless or dishonest.").
19 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii) (2000).
20 See id. § 1188(a)(1) (requiring the H-2A petitioner to show that "there are not
sufficient workers who are able, willing, and qualified, and who will be available at the
time and place needed" and that "the employment of the alien ... will not adversely
affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States"); 8 C.F.R. §
214.2(h)(6)(iv) (2001) (requiring a similar showing for the H-2B visa).
21 See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(1)(B) (2000).
22 Id. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b).
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job. 23 The liberalization of these burdensome requirements could
greatly increase use of these programs.24 We should expand access
to these programs by either liberalizing or eliminating labor
certification requirements, quotas, and restrictions on the duration
of guest-worker employment or on their stays in the United States.
We should also remove restrictions on the types of
employment that these guest workers may take, so that aliens are
free to seek any job in the United States, and all sectors of the U.S.
economy can benefit from hiring them. Recent discussions of an
expanded guest-worker program envisioned liberalization beyond
the agricultural sector to include the service sector of the U.S.
economy,25 which would represent at least a step in the right
direction. Better yet would be a program without any restrictions
on the employment open to guest workers.
Many worthwhile reforms would be consistent with the
economic interests of natives. The protection of the interests of
natives does not require many of the restrictions currently imposed
on guest workers.26 There is no need, for example, to restrict the
alien's freedom to move from one employer to another or from
one sector of the economy to another. Like immigration
restrictions in general, restrictions on mobility between jobs are
economically inefficient as well as unduly burdensome for the
worker subject to the restriction. Freedom to leave an employer
and to take employment elsewhere would give workers greater
power to assert their rights against employers and thus prevent
abuses, without destroying the gains from trade that natives enjoy
23 THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 395 (4th ed. 1998).
24 Admissions under H-2B visas have remained below one-third of the quota limit
in recent years, and admissions under H-2A visas have been similar. See id. at 393, 395
(noting that the demand for H-2B visas "would be much higher but for the double
'temporariness' requirement"); Alan 0. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration
Law, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION, supra note 12, at 158, 189 (noting that "because of the
transaction costs of obtaining a visa coupled with the limited certifications for labor
shortages in the agricultural sector," employers often find that H-2A visas "are not worth
the effort to procure").
25 See Diane Lindquist, Guest-Worker Plan Offers Jobs Beyond Farms, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Aug. 10, 2001, at A26.
26 Democrats in Congress have stressed that guest workers should enjoy the same
rights in the workplace as citizens. See Jonathan Peterson, Democrats Up Ante to
Reform Immigration, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2001, at Al.
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from employing alien workers. Thus, both Mexico and Democrats
in Congress have urged that a reformed guest-worker policy
include the freedom to change employers, 27 and a proposal
emerging from ongoing negotiations between the United States
and Mexico could include at least this reform.28 We can also
fortify the guest worker's incentives to complain about abuses
with protections against employer retaliation for whistle-blowers
or even bounties or other rewards for those who make meritorious
claims that their employers are violating the rights of employees.29
At the same time, we must reduce or eliminate the protectionist
barriers that we currently impose on employer sponsorship, such
as labor certification. These liberalizing reforms are especially
essential if we make the employee's visa more portable.
Employers will be reluctant to invest much time or money in
sponsoring a worker's visa if the worker is then free to leave to
work for a competing employer who can thereby take a free ride
on the sponsoring employer's investment in the visa.
Although the Bush administration has focused on negotiations
with Mexico, the United States should avoid any discrimination
among aliens based on national origin in an expanded guest-
worker program. Just as all sectors of the U.S. economy would
benefit from a liberalized program, the economy would also gain
by liberalizing access to its labor markets for all aliens regardless
of nationality. We can enjoy the same economic benefits from
workers from all nations, and to discriminate among workers
based on national origin needlessly introduces costly distortions in
the labor market. It is appropriate that Democrats in Congress
have urged broad liberalization for aliens of all nationalities3 ° and
27 See Cheryl W. Thompson, Democrats to Offer Plan to Reform Immigration,
WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2001, at A2; Corchado, supra note 17, at IA.
28 See Marcus Stern, New Immigration Plan Raises New Issues: U.S.-Mexican
Strategy Goes Beyond Amnesty, Guest-Worker Program, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug.
12, 2001, atAl.
29 The AFL-CIO has urged whistle-blower protections and amnesty for
unauthorized immigrants who complain about substandard working conditions or other
violations. See Nancy Cleeland, AFL-CIO Calls for Amnesty for Illegal U.S. Workers,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2000, at Al; Frank Swoboda, Unions Reverse on Illegal Aliens,
WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2000, at Al.
30 See Peterson, supra note 26, at Al; Thompson, supra note 27, at A2.
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that the Bush administration has seemed open to this suggestion."
We might also allow unskilled guest workers to adjust their
status to permanent residence without imposing a net burden on
natives if appropriate conditions are met.32 In fact, as the Bush
administration considers proposals to liberalize our immigration
policies, it has discussed an expanded guest-worker program that
would eventually allow guest workers to adjust their status to
permanent residence and ultimately naturalize as citizens. Mexico
has urged the United States to allow guest workers to remain
permanently, and a proposal including some sort of access to
permanent residence could eventually emerge from the
negotiations between the two countries.33 The conditions for
adjustment of status might include, for example, a sufficiently
lengthy period of residence and employment as a guest worker
without a criminal record, as well as payment of a sufficient
amount in taxes over this period.34  Thus, admission as a guest
worker need not entail permanent status as an alien. Empirical
evidence indicates that the United States could allow even an
unskilled immigrant to naturalize without generating a net fiscal
burden if a sufficient period of alienage with only limited access to
public benefits has passed.a
In reality, access to citizenship is a matter of degree. Aliens
might be given the opportunity to naturalize after a short period of
residence or only after a long period. We might demand a long
work history and a large amount of taxes paid or impose less
stringent requirements. A liberalized guest-worker program could
choose any point along this continuum to satisfy critics concerned
31 See Edwin Chen & Jonathan Peterson, Bush Hints at Broader Amnesty, L.A.
TIMES, July 27, 2001, at Al.
32 See Chang, supra note 5, at 223.
33 See Stem, supra note 28, at Al.
34 See Laurie Goering, Bush Considering Green Card "Points," CHI. TRIB., Aug.
22, 2001, at 1; Eric Schmitt, No Agreement Yet with Mexico on Immigration Plan, N.Y
TIMES, Sept. 1, 2001, at Al.
35 The National Research Council found that once we take the positive fiscal effect
of the immigrant's descendants into account, an immigrant with less than a high-school
education imposes a net fiscal cost of only $13,000 in net present value in 1996 dollars;
see NRC, supra note 6, at 334; and that if the 1996 welfare legislation excludes
immigrants from seven specified means-tested benefits for only their first five years in
the United States, then the total fiscal impact of the average immigrant would improve
by $8,000; see id. at 339.
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about the fiscal impact of unskilled immigrants or the political
impact of their naturalization. and participation in the electorate.36
In any event, a guest-worker program would not produce a
hereditary class of alien residents in the United States, because the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives U.S.
citizenship to anyone born in the United States, including the
children of nonimmigrants. 37 Thus, guest-worker programs in the
United States cannot create the type of caste society that they
might in countries that do not provide this birthright citizenship.
Furthermore, citizenship for the children of immigrants has proven
to be consistent with the national economic interest, as the
available evidence indicates that the descendants of even unskilled
immigrants have a positive fiscal impact.38
To help deflect criticism that we are rewarding unauthorized
immigrants for violating our immigration laws,39 we could refuse
to count unauthorized work or residence as a factor in granting an
alien status as either a guest worker or a permanent resident. We
could continue to require employer sponsorship, which would not
only ensure that the guest worker is gainfully employed (and thus
likely to provide a net economic benefit to natives), but also tend
as a practical matter to be a requirement most easily met by those
aliens who are already employed in the United States as
unauthorized immigrants. Thus, a guest-worker program could
function in effect as a means for unauthorized immigrants to
legalize their status without allowing them to derive any formal
36 See Sailer, supra note 15 (suggesting that the Republican Party resists
legalization of unauthorized immigrants because it fears adding Hispanic voters to the
electorate).
37 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside.").
38 See NRC, supra note 6, at 329 ("[T]he present value of the descendants of a
current immigrant ... is always positive, regardless of the immigrant's age at arrival and
education level.").
39 See Brownstein, supra note 14, at A26 ("(M]any conservatives say that creating
a broad path toward permanent residency would reward illegal immigrants for breaking
the law."); Thomas B. Edsall, Amnesty Proposal Is Huge Gamble for Bush, WASH. POST,
July 17, 2001, at A2 (quoting Sen. Phil Gramm as calling amnesty for unauthorized
immigrants ."very bad policy' that 'rewards lawlessness'); Peterson, supra note 15, at
A12 (quoting Rep. Tom Tancredo as criticizing amnesty for unauthorized immigrants as
"rewarding someone for breaking the law").
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benefit from their unauthorized residence or employment. Unlike
an amnesty program, which would only legalize the stock of
unauthorized immigrants already here, a guest-worker program
could also legalize some of the flow of unauthorized immigrants
into the United States, thereby providing a more permanent
solution to the problem of illegal immigration. These workers
would gain from having a legal alternative to illegal entry and life
as an unauthorized immigrant, which leaves them vulnerable to
deportation by the government and to abuse by employers.
To help deflect criticism that any legalization of unauthorized
immigrants is unfair to those waiting patiently for visas to
immigrate legally,4" a guest-worker program could give priority to
qualified applicants who have also applied for immigration visas
subject to backlogs. Such a program would have the advantage of
allowing those who are already entitled to permanent residence to
gain admission to the United States and its labor market sooner.
This reform would benefit not only the alien granted quicker
admission but also natives, who derive greater fiscal benefits from
the alien's earlier admission. The age of an immigrant at the time
of entry proves to be an important determinant of the total fiscal
impact of that immigrant. In general, the younger the immigrant
at the time of entry, the more working years the immigrant can
spend in the United States, the more tax revenues the immigrant
will contribute to public coffers prior to retirement, and the more
positive the immigrant's overall fiscal impact.4' Thus, a guest-
worker program that allows immigrants waiting in backlogs to
enter the United States sooner also allows natives to enjoy the
economic benefits of more of each immigrant worker's productive
years and improves the total fiscal impact of each of those
immigrants.
II. Liberal Ideals, the Interests of Aliens, and the Second-Best
Once we lift restrictions on the duration of a guest worker's
residence and employment in the United States, however, the
program raises the prospect of de facto permanent residents with
40 See Mittelstadt, supra note 15, at IA (quoting Rep. Tom Tancredo as calling
amnesty for unauthorized immigrants "a kick in the teeth to the thousands of individuals
across the world who are legally attempting to enter the United States").
41 See NRC, supra note 6, at 328 fig.7.10.
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only restricted access to citizenship.42 Liberal objections to this
prospect account for at least some of the political resistance to
expansion of these guest-worker programs. James Woodward
objects that "[t]he creation of a class of permanent residents who
are restricted from becoming citizens (if they should wish to do
so) or any similar system of differential status among a state's
permanent inhabitants is fundamentally incompatible with liberal
egalitarian ideals."43
As Joseph Carens and others have argued, however, the
exclusion of aliens is also incompatible with these ideals.
Consider the liberal theory of justice developed by John Rawls,
who asks what principles people would choose behind a "veil of
ignorance."44 In this "original position," people know nothing
about their own personal circumstances or traits and thus "do not
know how the various alternatives will affect their own particular
case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis
of general considerations. 45  This condition ensures that "the
parties are fairly situated and treated equally as moral persons. 46
Using Rawls's theory, Carens addresses the issue of immigration
restrictions as a question of social justice.47 In seeking a
justification for the exclusion of aliens, "we don't want to be
biased by self-interested or partisan considerations" and instead
"can take it as a basic presupposition that we should treat all
human beings, not just members of our own society, as free and
equal moral persons. 48 Carens identifies this premise as a basic
42 See Munoz, supra note 17, at M3.
43 James Woodward, Commentary: Liberalism and Migration, in FREE MOVEMENT:
ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND OF MONEY 59, 82
(Brian Barry & Robert E. Goodin eds., 1992) [hereinafter FREE MOVEMENT]. The
communitarian Michael Walzer adopts a similar position. See MICHAEL WALZER,
SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 56-61(1983) (arguing that
guest-worker programs are inconsistent with political justice in a democratic state).
44 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971).
45 Id. at 136-37; see id. at 141 ("If a knowledge of particulars is allowed, then the
outcome is biased by arbitrary contingencies.").
46 Id. at 141.
47 See Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV.
POL. 251, 255 (1987).
48 Id. at 256.
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feature of all liberal political theories,49 concluding that we should
"take a global, not national, view of the original position."
50
If we begin with equal concern for all persons, then
immigration barriers are morally suspect and demand justification.
All our immigration restrictions discriminate against individuals
based on their alienage, which in turn derives from immutable
characteristics, such as the geographic location of their birth (that
is, national origin) and other circumstances of birth such as
parentage. 51 National origin appears to be a trait that Rawls would
deem "arbitrary from a moral point of view."52 Carens concludes
that we cannot justify restrictions "on the grounds that those born
in a given territory or born of parents who were citizens were more
entitled to the benefits of citizenship than those born elsewhere or
of alien parents."53 Nor can we justify restrictions "on the grounds
that immigration would reduce the economic well-being of current
citizens., 54 Similarly, in a utilitarian calculation of global welfare,
"current citizens would enjoy no privileged position., 55  Carens
and others conclude from these cosmopolitan liberal premises that
"we have an obligation to open our borders much more fully than
we do now."56
49 See id. at 265 (claiming that "our social institutions and public policies must
respect all human beings as moral persons" which "entails recognition ... of the freedom
and equality of every human being"); id. at 269 ("No moral argument will seem
acceptable ... if it directly challenges the assumption of the equal moral worth of all
individuals.").
50 Id. at 256.
51 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("All persons born ... in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States .... "); 8 U.S.C. §
1401 (1994) (setting forth categories of "citizens of the United States at birth").
52 RAWLS, supra note 44, at 72.
53 Carens, supra note 47, at 261.
54 Id. at 262.
55 Id. at 263 ("[T]he utilitarian commitment to moral equality is reflected in the
assumption that everyone is to count for one and no one for more than one when utility is
calculated.").
56 Id. at 270. Carens condemns immigration restrictions: "Like feudal barriers to
mobility, they protect unjust privilege." Id. Similarly, Bruce Ackerman concludes that
immigration barriers are inconsistent with liberal principles: "I cannot justify my power
to exclude you without destroying my own claim to membership in an ideal liberal
state." BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 93 (1980); see
Roger Nett, The Civil Right We Are Not Ready For: The Right of Free Movement of
People on the Face of the Earth, 81 ETHICS 212, 224 (1971) ("May we expect the lesson
[Vol. 27
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Political realities, however, may prevent the adoption of the
immigration policies implied by these liberal ideals. If political
realities require us to choose between two alternatives, the
exclusion of an alien and the alien's admission as a guest worker,
both of which deviate from liberal egalitarian ideals, then how can
Woodward justify the choice that inflicts the greater harm on the
alien as well as on natives? 7 Ironically, Woodward himself notes
that if we act against a "background of non-ideal institutions and
behaviour" in a world "in which large numbers of people and
institutions fail to do what justice requires," we may "acquire
obligations which are different from those [we] would acquire
under more perfectly just institutional arrangements. '58  As
Woodward states the theory of the second-best:
It is not in general a defensible moral principle that if it is
obligatory (or even a good thing) to do P under ideal,
utopian circumstances, then it is also obligatory (or even a
good thing) to do P under the actual circumstances, no
matter how far they may differ from the ideal.59
Robert Goodin notes that "[t]here is much to be said for the
realist argument" that insists upon "the importance of not making
a fetish of moral ideals," because "doing the best you can in an
imperfect world may well require you to compromise any (indeed,
all) of your moral ideals" and a "[f]ailure to take due account of
the probable reactions of others can.. have consequences that
are truly catastrophic." 60
Although Woodward advances realist claims in defense of
immigration restrictions, they could more plausibly justify
which the Negro has taught his fellow Americans about denial of fair opportunities to be
repeated on a broader scale, with the underprivileged of the earth demanding
'desegregation' of nation states?").
57 Carens agrees that to admit guest workers without "giving them the opportunity
to become citizens" is "incompatible with our liberal democratic principles," but adds
that "so is a restrictive policy on immigration." Carens, supra note 47, at 268.
58 Woodward, supra note 43, at 78.
59 Id. at 77; see Joseph H. Carens, Migration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian
Perspective, in FREE MOVEMENT, supra note 43, at 25, 45 ("Ideals do not always
translate directly into prescriptions for practice because of the second-best problems
familiar from economic theory which have their analogue in moral theory.").
60 Robert E. Goodin, Commentary: The Political Realism of Free Movement, in
FREE MOVEMENT, supra note 43, at 248, 255.
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restrictions on alien access to public benefits and to citizenship.
Indeed, Woodward himself notes that "it is far from obvious that it
would be wrong . . . to limit eligibility for social welfare
programmes to citizens or long-term residents, if failure to do so
would jeopardize the continued existence of such programmes. 61
We might say the same about restrictions on alien access to public
benefits and citizenship if these restrictions are necessary to make
politically feasible the alien's access to our labor market and the
alien's admission in the first place.
After all, exclusion offers no obvious advantages over a guest-
worker program, whether from the standpoint of political justice or
from the perspective of the interests of the alien worker.62
Exclusion discriminates against the alien just as surely as guest-
worker status does. Like admission under a guest-worker policy,
exclusion is an exercise of the state's authority over the alien, and
neither policy offers the alien any role in the formulation of that
policy through participation in the U.S. political system. If we
must choose between these two forms of discrimination, then we
should opt for the guest-worker program, because complete
exclusion from the United States is the more sweeping form of
discrimination and inflicts the greater harm on the alien. The
guest-worker program at least offers the alien a choice, and by
choosing to come as a guest worker, the alien reveals a preference
for guest-worker status over the alternative of exclusion.63
These second-best arguments require us to rank two non-ideal
61 Woodward, supra note 43, at 79.
62 See Howard F Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic
Welfare and the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1192-94 (1997)
(arguing that a guest-worker program is better than a policy of exclusion).
63 See SIMON, supra note 18, at 303 ("Participating in the program must be better
for at least some persons than not participating, or else there would be no participants in
the program."). There seems little reason to second-guess the alien regarding the
decision to become a guest-worker. See id. at 310 (arguing that if we wish to show
respect for the alien's "human dignity," then "giving people the choice of whether they
do or do not wish to serve as guestworkers seems to be more dignified than deciding for
them that serving as guestworkers would not be good for them"). While paternalistic
regulations may be appropriate when we have evidence that individuals make irrational
choices, it is difficult to declare the decision to become a guest-worker irrational, given
the alternatives that these aliens face. See Seidman, supra note 12, at 143 ("Why should
anyone believe that a guest worker is 'exploited' when he receives higher wages and
more protection in the program than he would receive if he remained in his home
country?").
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alternatives, both of which fall short of our liberal ideals. 64 In this
regard, teleological moral theories have an advantage over
deontological theories. Under a teleological theory, "those
institutions and acts are right which of the available alternatives
produce the most good., 65  Once we specify the good, then a
teleological theory can provide a complete ranking of all
alternatives, including non-ideal alternatives.66 Deontological
theories, which do not maximize a good specified in advance,67
may not readily provide a ranking of non-ideal alternatives.68
We might, for example, specify the good as an appropriate
measure of social welfare, one based on the satisfaction of
preferences but excluding those preferences that violate liberal
principles of equality. Ronald Dworkin, for example, has
proposed such a teleological theory.69 If we apply this type of
consequentialism and adopt a cosmopolitan perspective, then a
guest-worker program represents the lesser of two evils when
compared with the alternative of exclusion. To exclude aliens
from our labor markets not only decreases global wealth but also
worsens its distribution, whereas a guest-worker program would
improve social welfare on both counts.7 °
From this cosmopolitan perspective, liberal opposition to
guest-worker policies is misguided, because the alternative of
exclusion raises even worse moral problems. Discriminating
64 See SIMON, supra note 18, at 310 ("Compared to a beautiful world of no borders
and perfect freedom to live with full rights wherever one likes, having both citizens and
non-citizens within a country may seem undesirable. But compared to a world in which
every country controls who may enter.., the comparison may seem quite different.").
65 RAWLS, supra note 44, at 24.
66 For definitions of a "complete" ordering, see ROBIN BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE,
WELFARE ECONOMICS 34 (1984) and JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN,
THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 26 (3d ed. 1953).
67 See RAWLS, supra note 44, at 30.
68 See id. at 303 (suggesting that "we may be able to find no satisfactory answer at
all" in "instances of nonideal theory").
69 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 234-38 (1977). I have
outlined a similar theory, which I call "liberal consequentialism." Howard F. Chang, A
Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE
L.J. 173, 195-96 (2000).
70 See Chang, supra note 5, at 207-08; Bob Hamilton & John Whalley, Efficiency
and Distributional implications of Global Restrictions on Labour Mobility, 14 J. DEV.
ECON. 61, 70-74 (1984).
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against aliens in the allocation of employment opportunities in the
United States may benefit some U.S. workers, but only at the
expense of employers who must bear higher labor costs, the
consumers who must pay higher prices for goods and services, and
the alien workers who are confined to labor markets where they
earn lower wages than those prevailing in the U.S. labor market
and are thus even worse off than the beneficiaries of the policy of
exclusion. Thus, the employment discrimination against aliens
implied by a policy of exclusion is difficult to justify from a
cosmopolitan perspective because its primary victims are poorer
than the workers who are privileged by this discriminatory regime.
If guest-worker programs make us uneasy, then exclusion should
only make us more so, because it keeps alien workers in a state of
poverty that they would prefer to escape as guest workers. In this
sense, the liberal who invokes ideal principles to condemn guest-
worker programs while favoring the alternative of exclusion is
vulnerable to the charge of "superstitious 'rule worship,"' that is,
"the charge of heartlessness, in his apparently preferring abstract
conformity to a rule to the prevention of avoidable human
suffering."71
III. Conclusion
From a welfare perspective, it is harmful public policy to
exclude the alien worker from not only U.S. citizenship but also
our labor market, given that admission as a guest worker would
make both the alien worker and U.S. natives better off. The
employment discrimination implied by a policy of exclusion is
difficult to justify whether we adopt the cosmopolitan perspective
or instead embrace less egalitarian liberal ideals and favor the
interests of natives over those of aliens. Considerations of both
global economic welfare and national economic welfare militate in
favor of liberalized alien access to our labor markets. While the
employment discrimination against aliens implied by our
immigration restrictions remains difficult to justify, some
discrimination against unskilled aliens in the distribution of public
benefits and in access to citizenship may serve the interests of
natives.
71 J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in J.J.C. SMART &
BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 3, 6 (1973).
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The cosmopolitan liberal would prefer that aliens have access
to both our labor market and ready access to public benefits and
citizenship. As a matter of political reality, however, natives are
unlikely to admit aliens under those generous conditions in the
numbers that cosmopolitan ideals would require, given the fiscal
burden that those liberal policies would entail. Given this
constraint of political feasibility, cosmopolitan liberals face a
trade-off: significantly liberalized access to our labor markets for
unskilled alien workers will likely require some restrictions in
access to public benefits and citizenship to have a realistic chance
of enactment. From a consequentialist perspective that extends
equal concern to aliens and natives, guest-worker programs are
less unjust than the status quo alternative of exclusion. Reforms
that reduce employment discrimination against aliens should prove
feasible, even while eliminating all discrimination against aliens
remains an unrealistic ideal. Therefore, cosmopolitan liberals
should support liberalizing reforms that include guest-worker
programs, even while seeking the broadest rights possible for
aliens within the constraints of political feasibility. While it would
be a mistake to pretend that this compromise is ideal from a liberal
egalitarian perspective, it would also be a mistake to sacrifice
worthwhile reforms because they fall short of the ideal.
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